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DE FACTO SEGREGATION
move litigation from state courts unless a statute clearly so re-
quires.3
The Supreme Court was undoubtedly correct in its construction
of the Act. Even though the use of interpleader to effect proration
among all claimants will result in delay before any successful claim-
ant can get execution against an insurer, and even though a claim-
ant will have to go into a second court to collect, the benefits of an
equitable distribution will inure to all claimants and outweigh the
procedural disadvantages. This is the only effective device at pres-
ent to achieve proration, and it might be desirable for Congress to
extend the provisions of the Act to allow an insurer to bring in the
underlying litigation in appropriate cases,3  since this would in turn
encourage insurers to interplead all claimants. But the better so-
lution might be other legislation, based on minimal diversity,s" to
allow a claimant to demand proration, leaving injured parties free
to bring their actions on liability in whatever courts they choose.
HENRY C. MCFADYEN, JR.
Constitutional Law-De Facto Segregation-The Courts
and Urban Education
In the controversial decision of Hobsen v. Hansen,' the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia found evidence
of discrimination in the policies, practices and administration of
the School Board and in the continued existence of de facto segre-
gation in the school system. The court concluded that the Negro
" E.g., National Cas. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 230 F.
Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964). Professor Chaffee argued that interpleader
should not extend to trials on liability. Chaffee, Federal Interpleader Since
the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 420 (1940).
" For example, when most of the claimants are from a single state and
the interpleading insurer is the principal fund holder as in Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, supra note 28.
" In the words of the Supreme Court, "Art. III poses no obstacle to the
legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long
as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens." 386 U.S. at 531.
'269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)
'Judge J. Skelly Wright, a member of the United States Court of Appeal
for the District of Columbia, was sitting as District Judge in this suit pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 291 (c) (1964).
'De facto segregation is a term used interchangeably with racial imbal-
ance denoting a fortuitous separation of races. A predominantly northern
and western phenomenon, it occurs when rigid neighborhood pupil assign-
ments are imposed on racially homogeneous neighborhood populations. See
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students were being unconstitutionally deprived of their right to
equal protection under the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.
The decision itself is susceptible to various interpretations, for
educational, social, and political considerations are intricately in-
terwoven within it. To acquire a meaningful understanding of the
court's position it is necessary to make a threefold analysis of the
decision: (1) the legal and constitutional issues in the decision,
(2) the practical effect of the decision on the D.C. school system,
and (3) the impact of the decision on the national level, particular-
ly as it relates to the development of educational policy in the ur-
ban public schools. No attempt will be made to resolve the prob-
lems raised in this analysis, but certain alternatives to the court's
position will be suggested.
Legal and Constitutional Issues
The conclusions of law enunciated in Hobsen v. Hansen were
based on a close scrutiny of the evidence presented, which included
a detailed empirical study of the D.C. School System. The court
subsequently made the following findings of fact: the school au-
thorities, relying principally on the neighborhood concept of pupil
assignment, were indifferent and apathetic to the resultant de facto
segregation and demonstrated in their attitudes an affirmative
acceptance of the status quo;' discriminatory practices were used
in the placement of teachers and principals; inequality existed in
Comment, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: Constitutional Dimen-
sions, 18 VANDEPnILT L. Rav. 1290, 1291 (1965).
'In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the companion case of
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court held that
the equal protection clause's proscription against de jure segregation was
an element of due process in the fifth amendment and thereby applicable to
the District of Columbia. Recent developments in the field of constitutional
law, including the frequent "incorporation" of parts of the first eight amend-
ments in the fourteenth amendment due process clause and the increasing
use of the equal protection clause to protect individual liberties, lead the
court to conclude that "the doctrine of equal educational opportunity-the
equal protection clause in its application to public education-is in its full
sweep a component of due process binding on the District under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967)
' The neighborhood concept of school districting and assignment has
long been considered a basic tenet of American public education. The critics
feel that this concept, which originated in a predominantly rural environ-
ment, no longer has relevance in the complex, urbanized, and more im-
personalized school systems of today. Id. at 409.
6 Id. at 503.
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the distribution of educational resources to the segregated schools ;7
and the track systems discriminated in practice, if not in theory, as
it grouped students on the basis of their socio-economic or racial
status instead of their natural ability.
In response to these findings, the court permanently enjoined
the District of Columbia school system against racial and economic
discrimination, abolished the optional zones9 and the track system,
ordered bussing of volunteer Negro students who wished to trans-
fer to undercrowded (white) schools, and ordered substantial in-
tegration of the faculty of each school."0 The court further ordered
the Board to submit a plan to the court by October 2, 1967, con-
cerning reasonable alternatives, such as educational parks or school
pairing,1' to correct the racial imbalance.' 2 The court refused to
support plaintiff's contention that an "area-wide" metropolitan
system, crossing state lines, was constitutionally required, although
it did suggest that defendants inquire into the possibility of such
an alliance with the surrounding suburbs.'3
"The court considered the following factors: (a) age of buildings, (b)
physical condition of schools, (c) physical congestion within the schools,
(d) quality of faculty, (e) textbooks and supplies, (f) per pupil expendi-
tures, and (g) curricula and special programs. Id. at 431-442.
8The track system is a form of ability grouping at both the elementary
and the secondary levels in which students are placed on certain curricula
tracks according to their ability to learn as determined by teacher evaluation
and standardized tests. Approximately 50 of the 114 pages of the original text
were devoted to an examination of the system, evidencing the court's aware-
ness of the danger of abolishing a legitimate, even if poorly administered,
educational technique.
The optional zones allowed students to choose from two or more schools
instead of being assigned to a specific neighborhood school; this had the
net effect of allowing whites to escape from predominantly Negro schools
to predominantly white schools. Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,
415-18 (D.D.C. 1967).
oId.* at 516.
111d. These are the two most frequently mentioned methods to integrate
schools, but both require that white communities be reasonably close to
Negro communities.
1" Racial balance is a physically impossible goal in the District schools,
for over 90 percent of the students enrolled are Negroes, and this percentage
is increasing annually.
"s Id. at 516. If this case had involved only school districts within a
single state, a different result might have occurred. See Wright, Public
School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40
N.Y.U. L. REv. 285, 305-06 (1965): "Undoubtedly if and when the Su-
preme Court tackles the suburban vis-a-vis the slum problem, it will again
remit the remedy to the district courts [as it did in the reapportionment
cases] with instructions to ignore the state-created political lines separating
the school boards and to run its orders directly against the state, as well as
local, officials."
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The court's recognition and application of the equal educa-
tional opportunity principle in the de facto context represents the
most controversial aspect of its decision.14 It examines the evi-
dence in light of three distinct theories-separate-but-equal, de jure
segregation, and de facto segregation-to arrive at the conclusion
that the Negroes have not received an equal educational opportunity
under the law.
The separate-but-equal principle, a modern day reformulation
of Plessy v. Ferguson," means simply:
[I]f white and Negroes, rich and poor, are to be consigned to
separate schools . . . the minimum the Constitution will require
and guarantee is that for their objectively measurable aspects
these schools be run on the basis of real equality, at least until
all inequalities are adequately justified. 16
This theory is novel in the de facto context, but it has precedent
in cases which preceded Brown v. Board of Education. 7  Although
Brown appeared to reject any further application of this theory,
the recent Supreme Court decision of Rogers v. Paul,8 has been
interpreted as implicity revitalizing this approach.1"
The real importance of the theory lies in the larger question of
whether a disproportionate share of resources need be given to the
Negro schools to provide an equal educational opportunity. The
court speaks of equality under the separate-but-equal theory in
terms of "objectively measurable" aspects, but if the Negro is to
overcome environmental and psychological handicaps and achieve
at the same grade level as his white schoolmates, the quality of
the facilities, teachers, and curricula must be superior to those in
predominantly white schools.
In the court's discussion of necessary remedies, it speaks of
the necessity of including measures of compensatory education in
"' This concept has been subject to close review recently by legal scholars.
See T. EMERSON, P. HABER, AND N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL LIBER-
TIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1779 (3d ed. 1967); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in
the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564
(1964) ; Rousselot, Achieving Equal Educational Opportunity for Negroes
in the Public Schools of the North and West: The Emerging Role of Private
Constitutional Litigation, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 698 (1967).
5163 U.S. 537 (1896).16 Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 496 (D.D.C. 1967).
17347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18382 U.S. 198 (1965).
19See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1966), aff'd per curiam on rehearing en banc, March 29, 1967.
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the court-ordered plan, but it is uncertain whether this arises from
the separate-but-equal theory. 0 Since it is equal educational op-
portunity rather than equality of expenditures that is the controlling
constitutional principle, the distribution of unequal resources might
well be justified:
[C]ultural deprivation [suggests a] . . . classification wherein
equality of concern and the equalization of educational oppor-
tunity requires the energetic and imaginative use of unequal
resources in order to achieve essentially equal results. 21
Under the de jure segregation theory, the court held that the
system of assigning teachers and principals to schools according
to personal preferences put the School Board in the position of
sanctioning the resultant segregation patterns and thus was un-
constitutional. A question arises whether the Board is constitu-
tionally required to have a definite ratio of white and Negro teach-
ers in each school. The court explicitly rejects the proposal for
the present time.' The use of optional zones was also declared
unconstitutional under this theory, as it constituted a subtle dis-
criminatory policy allowing whites to escape from integrated schools
to predominantly white schools.
The most important segment of the opinion, in terms of the
constitutional issues involved, dealt with the third theory that de
facto segregation in the D.C. school system unjustifiably denied
Negro students the opportunity of an equal education. Following
the lead of previous decisionsm and recent views of legal commen-
"Where because of the density of residential segregation or for
other reasons, children in certain areas, particularly the slums, are
denied the benefits of an integrated education, the court will re-
quire that the plan include compensatory education sufficient at
least to overcome the detriment of segregation and thus provide,
as nearly as possible, equal educational opportunity to all school
children. Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C.
1967).
21 COMM'N ON RACE AND EDUCATION, RACE AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY IN PORTLAND'S PUBLIC ScHooLs 187 (1964), as quoted in
Rousselot supra note 14 at 717. See also Horowitz, supra note 4 at 1167.
22 Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 516 (D.D.C. 1967).
2" See Blocker v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, remedy considered on
rehearing, 229 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). The court found uncon-
stitutional segregation where the most that could be said of the Board, as
in Hobsen, was that it had failed to correct an obvious racial imbalance for
which it was not responsible. Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59
Cal.2d 876, 382 P.2d 878 (1963). Barkesdale v. Springfield School Comrnm'n,
237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965), vacated and remanded with direction to
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tators,2 4 the court interpreted Brown as requiring an independent
assessment of the effects of segregation. Brown established the
principle of equal educational opportunity, and it held that any seg-
regation sanctioned by the "mandate of law or public policy pur-
sued under color of law" was inherently unequal and unconstitu-
tional.' But it did not speak to the question of whether a quan-
tum of official discrimination was necessary to invoke the principle
when significant harm was visited upon the Negro student, as de-
termined by a close study of the fields of education, sociology, and
psychology.
28
Thus, where there is de facto segregation, for which the govern-
ment is not responsible, the focus of inquiry must shift from an
examination of the official's motives to an evaluation of the amount
of detriment which occurs in the racially imbalanced schools. The
Brown rationale is not applicable, however, if the court can find
adequate justification for the inequality-producing classification-in
this case adherence to the neighborhood school system of pupil
assignment :27
[W]ith every inequality producing classification there remains
the question of justification. Ordinary statutory classifications
resulting in inequalities economic in nature are traditionally
upheld whenever the reviewing court can imagine a reasonable
or rational basis supporting the classification . . . [T]he ob-
jectives they [the classifications] further must be unattainable
by a narrower or less offensive legislative course; and even so,
those objectives must be of sufficient magnitude to override,
dismiss without prejudice, 347 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965), unequivocably takes
the position adopted in Hobsen:
The question is whether there is a constitutional duty to provide
equal educational opportunities for all children within the system.
While Brown answered that affirmatively in the context of
coerced segregation, the constitutional fact-the inadequacy of
segregated education [based on expert testimony presented]-is
the same in this case, and I so find....
Id. at 546-47.
24 Sedler, School Segregation in the North and West: Legal Aspects, 7
ST. Louis L.J. 228 (1962) states this concept in the form of a question:
Can the state still educate him [the Negro] on an integrated
basis thus providing equal educational opportunities and prevent-
ing feelings of inferiority and at the same time effectively operate
its educational system?
Id. at 256." Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967).




in the court's judgment, the evil of the inequality which the
legislature engenders.
28
The court also justifies the need for careful consideration of
the merits of the neighborhood policy because this particular prac-
tice operates in such a way that the Negro and the poor are harshly
and disproportionately disadvantaged, even though neither group is
intentionally singled out for special treatment.29 The cases which
are cited to support this position, Griffin v. Illinoi,3 0 and Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections,81 are concerned primarily with eco-
nomic discrimination. Taken by itself, a single reference to the
economic factor is unimportant, but when it is added to references
of economic discrimination in other parts of the opinion, specifical-
ly in the discussion of the track system and the separate-but-equal
theory, the court's approach becomes ambiguous.
This constant equation of the Negro and the poor might be the
embryonic beginning of a non-racial attitude by the courts toward
the whole problem of urban living. This may mitigate the effects
of the monolithic approach of many judges who are so preoccupied
with the integration problem that they lack the prospective to com-
prehend the interrelated economic problems. The decision also
avoids saying that de facto segregation is unconstitutional on its
face; but it is doubtful that this court will ever accept a de facto
segregation situation as permanently justified or necessary, at least
from a legal standpoint. When the court balances the different
considerations mentioned above, the educational and social advan-
tages of integrated schools accrued to both white and Negro chil-
dren outweigh the policies supporting strict adherence to the neigh-
borhood schools concept."2 Although the neighborhood plan per
se is not held unconstitutional, the decree that the Board consider the
feasibility of alternate measures suggests that strong reasons must
be given before the benefits of an integrated education are denied
to the Negro.33
The track system was held unconstitutional as it, too, represents
an unjustifiable arbitrary classification. Although the court accepts
ability grouping in general as reasonably relating to the govern-
28 Id.
"Id."351 U.S. 12 (1956) (fees required for appeal).
383 U.S. 663 (1960) (poverty and poll tax).
Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 509-10 (D.D.C. 1967).
"Id.
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mental function of public education, it maintains that such grouping
must be founded on something other than the standardized tests
84
presently administered. These tests, the evidence shows, group
according to environmental and psychological factors, not on the
basis of. innate ability. The results therefore are catastrophic to
the Negro child who is grouped in the lower tracks with rigid cur-
ricula and little chance of freeing himself from the false self-proph-
ecy of intellectual inferiority. The system is also condemned for
its failure to include and implement a compensatory educational
program that would provide more flexibility and more movement
upward in the tracks.
Undoubtedly, the specific constitutional issues raised by the
decision are important, but a significant legal problem exists on a
more abstract level. The uncertainties 0 accompanying any bal-
ancing of constitutional rights on the basis of empirical data and
the complexities of implementing a decree, once interference in the
educational system is found to be necessary, obviously do not create
stability or certainty in the legal process. The court is intervening
in an area in which it has an acknowledged lack of expertise,8" and
its involvement causes one to ask certain elementary but important
questions. Relating to the track systems, there is a real question
of what type of ability grouping is justifiable, and how accurate
tests must be before they constitute legitimate bases for grouping.
If no satisfactory tests are developed, will the disadvantaged child
be forced to compete in the classroom with the middle class white
(though this is practically impossible) because no satisfactory
tests (in the court's view) are devised? If bussing is the solution
to correct the unconstitutional inequalities, then what practical
considerations are involved? What weight is to be given to costs,
"See P. SEXTON, EDUCATION AND INCOME (1961), for the rationale
supporting this position.
" "There can, of course, be no mathematical formula to determine at
what point the unequal educational opportunity inherent in racial imbalance
... rises to constitutional dimensions." Wright, supra note 13, at 303.
Fiss agrees that "no matter how conscientious the court that decides the
question, an irreducible amount of uncertainty will remain." Fiss, supra
note 14, at 596.
"0 "It is regrettable, of course, in deciding this court must act in an area
so alien to its expertise. It would be far better indeed for these great social
and political problems to be resolved in the political arena by other branches
of government." Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967).
See Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General
Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 157, 182-86 (1963).
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time 9pent in transit, or ineffective or detrimental results from the
integrated experience? What considerations will guide the court
if the "area-wide" school system is found to be constitutionally
necessary, and how will the many side issues such as educational
financing be resolved?
Practical Effects
Despite the prevalence of constitutional and legal problems in
this area, the conclusions of the court are extremely important
in terms of the actual impact of the decision on the D.C. school
system. The decision will invariably have these initial consequences
in Washington: (1) an increase in the number of white students
migrating to the suburbs or to private schools, thereby increasing
the total percentage of Negroes well over the ninety per-cent-plus
figure that presently exists, and (2) the withdrawal from the sys-
tem of many white teachers who are eligible for retirement benefits,
especially if the court finds reassignment necessary. The court
ruling has already forced Superintendent Hansen to resign his
position.
37
Regarding the actual decree in light of subsequent developments,
the decision might have been unnecessary. Within a week of the
decision Negroes gained a majority on the School Board for the
first time in its history,"8 and would certainly have implemented
most of the measures the court decreed. Moreover, as Carl Han-
sen pointedly noted in an interview 9 subsequent to the decision, the
track system was to be abolished; a proposal for the discontinuance
of the optional zones was already being considered; and the free
bussing for children in overcrowded schools had been initiated
prior to the issuance of the opinion. Finally, the Passow Report,40
" See The Washington Post and Times Herald, July 4, 1967, at A 1,
col. 8. This resignation resulted specifically from the Board's refusal to
appeal the decision which repudiated Hansen's policies and, to some de-
gree, his integrity as an individual. The fact that he would probably resign
in the face of an adverse decision, despite the three year renewal of his
contract in March, 1967, was well known by those who participated in the
suit.
"8 With a new majority the Negroes elected the first Negro President of
the Board of Education. See The Washington Post and Times Herald,
July 2, 1967, A 1, col. 1.
U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, July 24, 1967, p. 42.
"The report on the D.C. school system made by Dr. Henry A. Passow
of the Columbia Teachers College, cost 250,000 dollars and involved over
180 consultants and specialists. For a brief summary of the findings, see
The Washington Post and Times Herald, Sept. 7, 1967, A 1, col. 6.
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preliminary findings of which were available to the Board soon
after the issuance of the opinion, contained extensive recommen-
dations for the D.C. System, which included many of the court's
ideas. It was based on exhaustive educational research and had
been commissioned by the Board.
It would seem from these factors that the decision was to serve
a dual purpose: (a) to repudiate the attitude implicit in the prac-
tices and policies of the school authorities and (b) to provide a new
legal and moral basis for change. The public reaction41 to the deci-
sion in Washington reinforces this view, for an atmosphere was cre-
ated which made positive action by the School Board not only
politically feasible but inherently necessary.
National Impact
Judge Wright was not interested, however, solely in the deci-
sion's catalytic effect on the D.C. educational power structure. The
length of the text and its exhaustive detail emphasize that the
impact of the decision was intended to be nationwide. Judge
Wright obviously expected the case to be appealed ultimately to the
Supreme Court, which required that the decision have a solid foun-
dation in fact and in law. Moreover, as a Federal District judge,
Judge Wright had been closely connected with the desegregation
of public schools in Louisiana and the admission of Negroes to
Tulane University.42  His judicial experience thus eminently quali-
fied him to make the first official, authoritative statement by a
member of the federal judiciary on the relationship of the equal
educational opportunity principle to the problem of de facto segre-
gation in urban education.
It can also be surmised that Judge Wright was writing to and
for the legal profession. In his decision, he establishes a model for
legal change in the de facto area by constructing a framework in
which the lawyer knows what type of evidence must be presented,
and the judge is given a method by which specific constitutional
issues can be resolved. Concurrently, his decision was intended
to be a catalyst for change on the national level, to spur action in
"' "The significance of the Wright decision . . . is that it gives the
school system a mandate for change." Jacoby, Mandate for Change, The
Washington Post and Times Herald, July 22, 1967, A 1, col. 4. The plaintiff,
Julius Hobsen, stated that the Passow Report "would have wound up in
the dust bin like the Strayer Report [the last study of the D.C. schools in
1949] if it weren't for the court decision." Id.
42 See NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1967, at 49.
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legislative bodies and school systems which have long bypassed this
problem.
43
The primary area in which this opinion will have national impact
is the present-day civil rights movement. There is a split among
civil rights leaders evidenced in their attitudes toward attempts to
improve the educational resources in predominantly Negro schools.
Some groups oppose a major commitment to ghetto schools. Other
elements, primarily associated with the "Black Power" movement,
have favored the improvement of educational resources in the ghetto
schools.44 The difference in attitude is explained by the former's
assumption that the only possible avenue to equal education oppor-
tunity for the Negro child is through integrated classrooms. Such
a view is implicit in Hobsen v. Hansen, and evidenced by the data45
which is judicially noted to support the court's conclusions.46
The dilemma in which the court finds itself is that in Washing-
ton, and in other urban areas, integration is impossible, at least in
the near future. Although the court is aware that racial imbalance
cannot be solved in the D.C. schools (and this is what the separate-
but-equal theory is all about), its attempt to deal with it is under-
mined by the acceptance of a principle which unequivocably rejects
the segregated school. Hobsen v. Hansen advocates a self-defeat-
ing policy by focusing its attention on integration as the sole means
enabling the Negro to attain the ultimate goal of educational equal-
ity. This is especially important since there is some indication that
quality education can be had in the all-Negro school. The Passow
Repor 7 emphasized that quality education was possible, if and
when adequate resources were allocated to the predominately Negro
"3 New York, California, Maryland and New Jersey were the first, and
still remain, the principal states to take legislative action to correct im-
balance. See 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 269 (1962); 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 738
(1962); 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 738 (1963); 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 1226
(1963).
"See Rousselot, supra note 14, at 715.
"See 1 U.S. ComiussioN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967) (published in 2 vols.) [hereinafter cited as
U.S.C.R.C. REPORT]; U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, EQUALITY OF EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY (Coleman ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as COLEMAN
REPORT].
"' Alsop, No More Nonsense About Ghetto Education, THE NEW RE-
PUBLIC, June 22, 1967, at 20, characterizes this attitude of the liberals:
[G]hetto children can never be rescued, can never be educated,
unless they are subject to the benign classroom influence of mid-
dle class children.
"See supra note 40; The Washington Post and Times Herald, Sept. 7,
1967, A 1.
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D.C. schools. The "More Effective Schools"48 program, initiated
in Harlem in 1964-1965 is the latest of several new programs initi-
ated for the ghetto schools. Its tests results indicate that Negro
children can achieve at the same grade level with his middle class
white counterpart even if taught in a segregated school."'
Though these special programs have not been as successful as
their advocates might hoper0 the realities of the situation alone dic-
tate a more flexible approach by the court's than is found in Hob-
sen v. Hansen. If the white community does not accept the neces-
sity of integration, and there is no indication that it is so pre-
disposed at present,51 then it may effectively block any implemen-
tation of corrective measures by moving further into the suburbs
or by sending its children to private schools. And bussing is by its
very nature confined to certain time and space limits.
This conflict between constitutional necessity and social reality
will often leave the courts with no alternative but to revive such
theories as the separate-but-equal principle. But again the basic
dilemma reappears if the court has already committed itself to the
view that a segregated education is inherently unequal for the
Negro and that no amount of compensatory education can effective-
ly overcome this disadvantage.
The court reaches its position that the integrated school is the
primary solution to this problem by citing the latest sociological
and psychological findings in this area, and by emphasizing the
inherent destructiveness of a segregated society. 2  In the former, it
implicitly relies on the Coleman Report3 and the United States
Civil Rights Commission Report54 which includes the very latest
research in this area.
8 See Alsop, supra note 46, at 21.
"9 See Maslow, De Facto Puiblic Segregation, 6 VILL. L. REv. 353, 374-75
(1962); also Nancy Hoyt St. John, The Effect of Segregation on the As-
pirations of Negro Youth, 36 HARV. L. REV. 284, 286 (1965). For a discus-
sion of the different measures that can be used to educate the disadvantaged
child, see Ornstein, Program Revision For Culturally Disadvantaged Cil-
dren, 35 J. oF NEGRo ED. 117 (1965).
" See Swartz, Pettigrew and Smith, Fake Panaceas For Ghetto Educa-
tion: A Reply to Joseph Alsop, THE NE W REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 1967, at 16.
' See Alsop, supra note 46, at 19, for statistics on this rapid migration.
82Judge Wright quotes Fiss in the opinion: "Segregation perpetuates
the barriers between the races; stereotypes, misunderstandings, hatred and
the inability to communicate are all intensified." Hobsen v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401, 504-05 (D.D.C. 1967).




The Coleman Report did not attempt to separate all other fac-
tors such as cultural deprivation or social class in determining the
effects of racial imbalance. Its basic findings, however, did show
that the equality of educational opportunity was lowered when
culturally disadvantaged children were placed together in public
schools. Also, it concluded that pupil achievement is more closely
correlated to the aspirations and educational experience of the other
students in the school than to the quality of the facilities, teachers,
or curriculums. 5 The U.S.C.R.C. Report, however, re-analyzed
the data in the Coleman Report and declared that there was a direct
correlation between racial imbalance and Negro achievement:
"There is . . a relationship between the racial composition of
schools and the achievement and attitudes of most Negro students,
which exists when all other factors are taken into account."50
Despite this conclusion of the U.S.C.R.C. Report, the most sig-
nificant finding in either report was that a Negro child's achieve-
ment is highly correlated with his belief that he can control his
own destiny.57 Coleman himself feels that "the one factor more
highly related to achievement than anything else was the child's
concept of whether his environment was responsive in any way to
him."'5 8  Floyd McKissick, National Director of CoXE explains
this view:
One wonders if that thing 'middle class' is not really a way
of saying that the middle class child is helpless and vulnerable,
that he knows his parents can and will go to bat for him, that
he carries that attitude around with him, that his teachers
perceive him differently, and that he is treated differently.59
It should be noted that the Coleman Report and the U.S.R.C. Re-
port suggest that it is the poor in general, rather than the Negro
in particular, who respond to good and bad schools.60
Hobsen v. Hansen foresees the danger in such a separatist view,
and it appreciates the need for an integrated society as an ultimate
5 COLEMAN REPORT 22
=' U.S.C.R.C. REPORT 204.
= See Jencks, The Racial Gap, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 1966, at 22.
This article contains an excellent summary of the findings of the Colenan
Report.
NEWsWEEK, Sept. 25, 1967, at 75.
McKissick, Is Integration Necessaryf THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 3,
1966, at 35.
" See U.S.C.R.C. REPORT 79.
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goal. But is not the court irresponsible in telling the Negro com-
munity that an integrated education is indispensable to a quality
education for their children when it has neither the power nor the
resources to create this necessary prerequisite. If it is accepted
that the educational needs for the Negro are immediate and press-
ing, then the court should not create impediments to the resolution
of these needs. Integration is only one of the means to an end,
which is equality for all. Since there may be another means
which are capable of producing this equality in education, the lib-
eral community, and the expression of its views in the courts, must
not limit the attention of "Negroes to the sole issue of integration,
so that they cannot conceive of any other road toward equality."0 1
CONCLUSION
Hobsen v. Hansen is presently being appealed in the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Regardless of
whether the decision reaches the Supreme Court of the United
States, its impact has already been felt nationwide.0 " In the process
of dissemination, the actual content of the decision and its impli-
cations have often been inaccurately reported. This discussion was
intended to give a more accurate analysis of the decision, concen-
trating not only on the narrow legal and constitutional issues in-
volved, but on the intended and actual impact of the decision.
In the examination of the case several basic problems in the
court's reasoning have been discussed. First, there is a latent am-
biguity in the decision, resulting from the court's vacillation be-
tween an economic and racial analysis of the issues, although the
racial element ultimately dominates the court's thinking.
Another problem raised is the role of the court in the educational
process. Where should the line be drawn when judges decide issues
normally delegated to the sphere of professional educators, to local
school authorities, to the local community? Conversely, how may
school authorities pursue legitimate educational concepts even if
integration is not a primary factor in their formulation?
The third and major area of concern is the court's view that
"' Oscar Handlin, Is Integration the Answer?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
March 1964, at 49. Handlin continues: "[T]herefore, integration is not an
end but a means toward an end. Equality of education, housing, employ-
ment, and politics is the goal, and genuine progress in that direction will




integration is the only feasible means to obtain equal educational
opportunity. This doctrine collides head-on with the social impossi-
bility at present of achieving this goal. Whether other courts
will be flexible enough to explore alternative solutions, instead of
following the precedent of Hobsen v. Hansen, with its inherent
rigidity, might have an important bearing on the ultimate means
employed to solve the educational crisis in the urban schools.
There has been no attempt to formulate answers to the issues
raised in the case, except to suggest that the courts not narrow
their inquiry to the integration question alone. While few educa-
tors would deny that integration should be an important goal of any
educational system, if techniques and programs are developed
which prove to be effective within the different locales, the court
should reconsider before condemning them as discriminatory, mere-
ly because integration is not an end result.
NEILL G. McBRYDE
Constitutional Law-Governmental Regulation of Surface
Mining Activities
Surface mining in the United States has affected 3.2 million
acres of land. Of this total, 2.0 million acres need varying de-
grees of treatment to alleviate a range of environmental damage
both on-site and off-site. About 20,000 active operations are dis-
turbing the land at a rate estimated in excess of 150,000 acres
annually. Data submitted by the surface mining industries in-
dicate that, in 1964, the amount of land partially or completely
reclaimed was equivalent to only 31 percent of the area dis-
turbed in that year. Surface mining activities are expected to
expand rapidly in coming years. By 1980, it is expected that
more than 5 million acres will have been affected by surface
mining.
Some damage from surface mining is inevitable even with the
best mining and land restoration methods. But much can be done
to prevent damage and to reclaim mined lands.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In an operation having the magnitude of surface mining in the
United States, the relationship existing between this activity and
the general public and the degree of control to be exercised in the
'STRIP AND SURFACE MINE STUDY POLICY COMM., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, SURFACE MINING AND OUR ENVIRONMENT 104 (1967).
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